INTRODUCTION
Goodwill has long been the subject of controversy. In the normally restrained lexicon of accounting literature, it stands out as a phenomenon which has attracted an unusual degree of discussion framed in a vocabulary better viewed as emotive than technical. It has been described, variously, as embarrassing, risky, impalpable, unreliable and undesirable (More 1891 , Dicksee 1897 , Densham 1898 ).
Outbursts such as these were not confined to late 19 th century commentaries. In the 1920s,
Canning noted the fickle nature of goodwill and the confusion which surrounded accounting, measurement and reporting practices for it (Canning 1929: 42) . By the 1960s authoritative commentators were still railing against goodwill, describing it as lacking legitimacy or enduring quality (Spacek 1963 , Chambers 1966 ). More than a century's worth of commentary and analysis on the subject has cemented goodwill's status as the black sheep of the balance sheet (Carlin and Finch 2007) .
It can be of little surprise given the foregoing that prescribed practice in relation to goodwill accounting and reporting has varied significantly. Through time and across a range of jurisdictions, reporting standards relating to goodwill have allowed, recommended or required a tangled web of contradictory treatments. These have included tacit permission to avoid recognition of goodwill through loose interpretation of acquisition accounting rules 1 , capacity to write off goodwill immediately against capital, reserves or retained earnings, requirements that goodwill be capitalised but not amortised, requirements that goodwill be capitalised and amortised against periodic earnings and enormous variation in the amortisation regimes to which goodwill was subjected, where amortisation was the order of the day 2 (Gibson and Francis 1975 , Carnegie and Gibson 1987 , Davis 2005 .
Viewed in this context, the adoption in Australia of an IFRS based financial reporting framework in which the application of purchase accounting is prescribed to the exclusion of 1 Questionable application of pooling of interests accounting where purchase accounting which would have given rise to goodwill on acquisition was ostensibly the correct technique in the circumstances of the transaction. 2 Common variations have included differences in allowable amortisation timeframes as well as variations in allowable amortisation techniques, ranging from loose capacity to amortise on any systematic basis through to rigid requirements that straight line amortisation be used to the exclusion of all other techniques. all other techniques 3 and the prior practice of mandatory annual amortisation of goodwill against earnings is removed in favour of periodic value impairment testing represents simply the latest episode in a highly contested history.
Despite the infancy of the "capitalise and test for impairment" approach required under IFRS and the very similar approach mandated under US GAAP, considerable anxiety about the efficacy and basis in principle of this framework is already evident (Lonergan 2007, Ramanna and Watts 2007) . Further, it is clear from the practitioner literature that organisations subject to the new impairment testing regime for goodwill accounting and reporting have rapidly developed mechanisms designed to minimise the risk of undesired impairment losses (Harris and Caplan 2002, Eldridge 2005) .
These include the exercise of discretion in the allocation of acquisition purchase consideration between various asset classes and across the operating units which comprise a business, the exercise of judgement in the selection of appropriate market value benchmarks and the exercise of judgement in the selection of key valuation model input parameters including growth rates and risk adjusted discount rates (Lonergan 2006) . Each of these factors has the capacity to materially impact the robustness and outcome of impairment assessment exercises undertaken by reporting entities, especially when using the value in use method for estimating a recoverable amount.
However, given the high reliance on discounted cash flow modelling as a basis for developing asset recoverable amount estimates, a pervasive and materially influential assumption required by financial statement preparers in the context of an impairment testing based regime relates to the discount rates selected to transform forecasts of future cash flows into their present value equivalents (Carlin and Finch 2008) . Over extended cash flow forecast horizons such as those employed for the purposes of testing for asset impairment 4 , present value estimates can be highly sensitive even to small variations in applied discount rates.
3 Resulting in the significant probability that in any given acquisition transaction, goodwill will arise and need to be accounted for as an element of the resulting consolidated financial statements. 4 Cashflows are typically modelled to perpetuity.
Consequently, this study focuses on evidence on the selection of discount rates for the purposes of goodwill impairment testing and on the degree to which that evidence is consistent with statements made by commentators such as Watts (2003a Watts ( , 2003b who have suggested that asset impairment testing regimes such as those embedded in SFAS 142 -Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets and IAS 36 -Impairment of Assets are flawed in that they offer financial statement preparers a fecund environment in which to opportunistically exercise discretion to the detriment of transparency, comparability and decision usefulness.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of the technical context to the research. Section 3 provides details of the data drawn upon for the purposes of the study and the methodology employed. Section 4 contains an overview and discussion of the key results, while Section 5 comprises a series of conclusions and suggestions for future research.
TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
Whereas the capitalise and amortise regime for goodwill reporting which existed in Australia between 1988 5 and 2005 operated on the basis of the assumption that the useful life of goodwill was finite 6 , no such a priori assumption informs the IFRS approach to goodwill.
Instead, the commencing assumption of the IFRS based regime is that the period over which goodwill may render economic benefits is best understood to be indefinite. Given this overarching assumption, to require annual amortisation charges against outstanding goodwill balances would be to embed a clear logical non sequitur in the IFRS goodwill standard.
It does not follow from the assumption that goodwill may render economic benefits over an indefinite period that the value of goodwill will also be maintained indefinitely. (Carlin and Finch 2008) .
Determination of CGU value in use requires the construction of discounted cash flow models, a fact which necessitates a view on the part of reporting entities 11 on factors such as growth trajectories and risk. In turn, IAS 36 contains detailed disclosure provisions designed to internally generated goodwill. This contradicts both a long standing admonition against the recognition of internally generated goodwill, but also the prohibition on the upwards revaluation of goodwill, since by definition, any recognition of internally generated goodwill must have resulted from some internal revaluation process. See (Lonergan 2006 , Lonergan 2007 render transparent the nature of key inputs and assumptions drawn upon in the construction of discounted cash flow models used to generate estimates of CGU recoverable amount 12 .
In practice, there is evidence to suggest that reporting entities have complied loosely, and often not at all with the mandated disclosure requirements of IAS 36. For example, firms appear to systematically define fewer CGUs than appropriate, with the result that the recognition of impairment losses may be inappropriately delayed 13 and are insufficiently transparent in their future growth rate projection disclosures (Carlin and Finch 2008) .
Disclosures pertaining to discount rates, key factors wielding substantial influence over the outcome of any present value calculation, have also tended not to conform to the requirements of IAS 36. For example, some firms fail to disclose any details of the discount rates employed in the process of value in use based recoverable amount estimation, despite an explicit requirement to do so 14 .
Far more significantly, it is plain on any reading of IAS 36 that the discount rates employed for the purposes of transforming CGU future cash flow estimates to their present values are required to relate to the risk characteristics of each CGU. This engenders the expectation that firms assigning goodwill to multiple CGUs should also adopt multiple appropriate risk adjusted discount rates for the purposes of recoverable amount estimation. However, available empirical evidence demonstrates that in a substantial number of instances, firms disclose the application of a single discount rate as an element of the estimation of the recoverable amount of all CGUs Finch 2007, Carlin and Finch 2008) .
Earlier studies have addressed this phenomenon from the perspective of yielding insight into compliance behaviour among listed reporting entities as well as in relation to the effectiveness of regulatory and institutional mechanisms designed to assure the quality of financial disclosures by these economically and systemically important organisations. By way of contrast, the focus of this study lies on the level of the discount rates selected by reporting entities as an element of their impairment testing regime. 12 These provisions have been discussed in detail elsewhere -see Carlin and Finch 2008. 13 For a discussion of this issue, known as the CGU aggregation problem see variously; Lonergan 2006 , Lonergan 2007 , Carlin and Finch 2007 , Carlin and Finch 2008 14 See IAS 36.130(g).
The opportunity to undertake this line of enquiry arises principally because of the high frequency with which firms define only one discount rate for the purposes of impairment testing. This in turn opens the way to comparative analysis pursuant to which the single point discount rates defined by reporting entities may be compared with independently generated single point 'whole of firm' discount rates.
In circumstances where firms define multiple CGUs and assign unique risk adjusted discount rates to each, the execution of this form of comparative analysis is rendered difficult because of the greater degree of challenge in independently estimating discount rates applicable to parts of business enterprises, rather than the whole 15 . Thus this study focuses solely on discount rates set by firms which applied a single discount rate only in the process of undertaking mandated impairment testing.
If opportunism is not a substantial feature of the approach taken by reporting entities as they approach the requirements of the IAS 36 impairment testing regime, a strong coincidence between discount rates defined by reporting entities and those capable of being independently estimated as representing the risk profile of those entities should be apparent. In the alternative, substantial deviations between disclosed discount rates and independently estimated risk adjusted discount rates may provide evidence consistent with the existence of opportunism. Section 3 below sets out details of the methodology employed and dataset interrogated for the purposes of illuminating these issues.
METHOD AND DATA
IFRS came into effect in Australia for firms with reporting periods on or after 1 January Of these 200 firms, 19 were excluded on the basis that they failed to make even basic disclosures in relation to the approach they took to impairment testing, resulting in a lack of data to support the analytical techniques employed for the purposes of this study. Another 17
were excluded from the final sample on the grounds that they used the fair value less cost to sell approach to testing for goodwill impairment, meaning that no discount rate disclosures were available for these firms.
Another 7 firms were excluded on the basis that they used a combination of fair value and value in use approaches, meaning that no single discount rate applicable to the whole of their business was disclosed. Finally, 52 firms were excluded on the basis that they defined multiple discount rates, rather than a single 'whole of firm' discount rate amenable to the form of benchmarking which lies at the heart of the methodology employed for the purposes of this study. Thus, the final research sample comprised 105 firms which employed the value in use approach to goodwill impairment testing and defined only one discount rate. 17 The All Ordinaries Index is the most extensive index covering the Australian stock market comprising a maximum of 500 of the largest companies listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. While the All Ordinaries Index is no longer an institutional benchmark index, having been superseded by a more concentrated series of benchmark indices, the index has the largest coverage of all Australian equities indices and typically represents more than 95% of the market capitalisation for Australia (Standard & Poor's, 2004) . 18 In undertaking the process of sample compilation, the audited financial statements for a total of 412 listed firms were screened. These firms had a combined market capitalisation of $1.350 trillion which represented 97.12% of the total Australian equity market capitalisation as at December 2006.
The objective of the study was to compare the single 'whole of firm' discount rates disclosed by sample firms with independently generated central point 'whole of firm' discount rates.
This being so, it was necessary to ensure that all discount rates disclosed by sample firms had been expressed on a comparable basis. IAS 36 requires 19 the use of pre-tax discount rates for the purposes of impairment testing. Despite this, a number of firms in the final research sample disclosed post tax rather than pre-tax discount rates 20 . These were converted to pretax equivalent rates by dividing them by one minus the prevailing corporate tax rate 21 .
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was used as a basis for developing independent estimates of discount rates for the purposes of facilitating comparisons with firm discount rate disclosures. The use of CAPM is the preferred method to estimate an appropriate discount rate as it represents the current market assessment and the risks specific to the CGU asset. The use of CAPM is also consistent with the requirement stipulated in IAS 36 22 that discount rates employed should be asset specific with respect to risk and independent of financing considerations.
In deriving a comparison discount rate for each sample firm, the following steps were undertaken:
( Australia Limited (Commercial Services & Supplies) applied a post tax discount rate of 13%; Cochlear Limited (Health Care) applied a post tax discount rate of 9.5%. 21 Lonergan (2006) notes that this approach is an oversimplification and will only lead to consistency on a before and after-tax basis when cash flows are in perpetuity and there is no growth in these cash flows. However, since this is a generally accepted and orthodox approach to the conversion of post tax discount rates to pre-tax rates, it is adopted for the purposes of this study. 22 Paragraph A19.
The levered beta (β L ) was then adjusted by the book-value leverage ratio specific to each firm, and the company tax rate, to derive the unlevered asset beta (β u ) using the Hamada (1972) equation shown below at Equation 1:
Where: 
Where:
r a = the expected after-tax rate of return specific to the firm's assets r f = the long-term risk free rate β u = the unlevered asset beta of the firm r f -r m = the market risk premium for equity shareholders
The long-term risk free rate (r f ) assumes a value of 5.885% being the Australian Government 10 year bond market yield at December 2006 23 .
The expected market risk premium for equity shareholders (r f -r m ) assumes a value of 6.0%.
This figure is consistent with the findings Officer (1989) 
Finally, the expected after-tax rate of return specific to the firm's assets (r a ) is adjusted to reflect a pre-tax comparison discount rate by dividing the value by 0.7, being 1 minus the company tax rate of 30%.
The discount rates estimated pursuant to this process were compared with those disclosed by each of the sample firms. The variance between estimated and observed discount rates was calculated and stratified on an industry sector basis and on the basis of the goodwill intensity of each sample firm. Goodwill intensity is a measure of the sensitivity of sample firm reported profit to goodwill impairment charges, and is measured using Equation 3 below:
Goodwill intensity = Goodwill / Net profit before tax (3)
A goodwill intensity score of greater than 1.0 suggests a high degree of sensitivity to a current period loss as a result of an impairment expense. The greater the goodwill intensity value, the greater the risk of losses in the current period. A goodwill intensity score of greater than zero but less than 1.0 suggests a lower degree of sensitivity to a write-down in current period profit as a result of an impairment expense, while a goodwill intensity score of less than zero implies the firm is already unprofitable and any impairment expenses will only further increase current period losses. The results of the analysis are set out in Section 4, below.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Though the focus of this study lies on variation between independently estimated and observed disclosed discount rates employed for the purposes of goodwill impairment testing, data gathered for the purpose of analysis reinforced the findings of earlier studies on disclosure compliance and quality. For example, it was a necessary precondition for inclusion in the research sample employed for the purposes of this paper that firms disclosed only one discount rate. Yet IAS 36 stipulates clearly 24 that discount rates employed for the purposes of impairment testing should relate to the underlying risk characteristics of each defined cash generating unit (CGU).
24 IAS36 requires that the discount rate be asset specific with respect to risk and independent of financing considerations (IAS 36.A19).
Of course, in some instances, goodwill will be associated with one CGU only, meaning that for all practical purposes, only one defined discount rate will be required for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of the standard. However, as the data in Table 1 below makes clear, it was only in a minority of cases 25 that the firms included in the final research sample defined only one CGU. Consumer Services (n=3) As the number of defined CGUs grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to accept the validity of the risk homogeneity proposition implicit in the determination that a single discount rate should be employed for the purposes of impairment testing. Thus, the data in Table 1 of itself provides evidence of the likelihood that inappropriate discount rates are being employed in the impairment testing processes used by large listed reporting entities.
Where goodwill is not material, the application of inappropriate discount rates is unlikely of itself to substantially reduce the decision usefulness of information contained in financial 25 Only 30 of 105 firms in the sample, or 28.5%.
reports. Yet in the firms included in the final research sample, it was evident that goodwill was material in general, particularly when benchmarked against reported before tax earnings.
Goodwill intensity 26 represents a measure of the sensitivity of firms to changes in goodwill valuation and in particular of earnings streams to potential impairment charges.
Across the final sample, mean goodwill intensity was 2.41 with a minimum value of -4.76, a maximum value of 18.80, and a standard deviation of 3.25. Thus, for firms included in the research sample, goodwill was on average almost 250% as large as reported before tax earnings, suggesting that even relatively small proportionate impairment of goodwill could generate disproportionate impacts on earnings. Data pertaining to the goodwill intensity of the firms included in the final research sample is set out in Table 2 , below. 
>5
Capital Goods (n=11) It is apparent that for many firms included in the final research sample, the requirement to recognise an impairment charge against goodwill would result in a material impact on reported earnings. Consequently, in a bid to defend against the prospect of such an unwelcome state of affairs, it is possible that in modelling CGU recoverable amount, some reporting entities may use lower than appropriate discount rates. The impact of the application of such a stratagem is to increase the likelihood that estimates of the CGU recoverable amount exceeds CGU book value and to increase the level of "headroom"
between CGU book value and recoverable amount estimates.
Because any technique for estimating discount rates is subject to potential error, interpretation of variances between independently estimated and observed actual discount rates requires a degree of care. Consequently, any observed discount rates which fell within a band of plus or minus 150 basis points (bps) of independently estimated discount rates were regarded as falling within a reasonable expected range, and thus not consistent with the notion of bias in the selection of discount rates.
By contrast, variances between expected and observed discount rates of a magnitude of 150bps cannot be as readily explained as the product of estimation error, and may be consistent with the existence of systemic bias on the part of listed reporting entities in the selection of discount rates for the purposes of impairment testing. Table 3 below contains details of variances categorised by the magnitude and direction of the differential between estimated and observed discount rates across the final sample. For each industry sector, the data shows the number and proportion of firms which fell into each variance category 27 . 
Fewer than a third of all firms included in the final research sample disclosed the use of discount rates which fell in a range of 150 bps around our estimate. Perhaps more strikingly, in those instances where observed discount rates lay more than 150 bps from estimated value, the dominant pattern was for observed discount rates to be lower rather than higher than estimated value. This was so in 57 of the 105 firms included in the final sample, with 40 instances in which observed discount rates were in excess of 250 bps lower than our independent risk adjusted estimate. Comparatively few firms (a total of only 16% of the research sample) disclosed discount rates which lay substantially above our discount rate estimate.
A number of factors may explain this tendency in the data. One possibility is the existence of a systemic bias in the manner in which the independent discount rate estimates employed for the purposes of the study were generated. If aspects of the methodology used to generate these discount rate estimates would tend on average to inflate discount rate estimates, the resulting pattern of variances between estimated and observed discount rates would likely appear similar to those apparent in Table 3 , above.
However, a combination of methodological factors militate against this possibility. First, the data provider from whom betas were sourced for the purposes of supporting discount rate estimates curtails published betas at an upper value of 2.0 in a bid to reduce outliers 28 .
Second, the risk free rate employed falls at the lower end of the generally accepted range.
Third, the market risk premium employed also falls at the low end of the generally accepted range of values assigned to this variable discount rate modelling. Finally, in transforming levered betas to unlevered betas using the Hamada process 29 , a process for estimating leverage likely to produce higher rather than lower values was employed. This in turn results in lower unlevered betas being inferred, with the consequence of reduced estimated risk adjusted discount rates.
Consequently, it appears defensible to argue that rather than being the product of methodologically induced estimation errors, the contours of the discount rate variance distribution may be explained by other factors, including the exercise of discretion and opportunistic behaviour among reporting entities. Bearing this possibility in mind, it is striking when inspecting the data set out in Table 4 to note that whereas the firms included in the final research sample reported goodwill totalling slightly over $28 billion in value, the value of goodwill reported by firms which disclosed discount rates higher than independently estimated rates totalled only approximately $1 billion.
By contrast, the dollar value of goodwill reported by firms whose disclosed discount rates law between 150 and 250 bps below independently estimated rates totalled approximately $3.6 billion, while firms whose disclosed rates lay in excess of 250bps below estimate reported almost $9.3 billion in goodwill. The summary level data suggests that approximately $14 billion or 50% of total sample firm goodwill had been tested for impairment using discount rates which fell within a 150 bps range of an independently estimated risk adjusted discount rate. However, this result must be interpreted with caution given that just 1 of the 31 28 Aspect Financial Analysis 29 As described in section 3, Equation 2. firms 30 which fell into this category reported goodwill of $8 billion -or almost 60% of goodwill in the relevant range.
Upon viewing the data on an industry sector basis, the effect of the potential distortion induced by this large outlying value observation comes into relief. In 10 of 14 industry sectors covering 76 of 105 firms in the total research sample, a distinct majority of reported goodwill had been subjected to impairment testing using discount rates more than 150bps below expectations. Further, in 8 of these industry sectors covering 71 of 105 firms in the total research sample, a minimum of two thirds of goodwill by value had been impairment tested using discount rates in excess of 250bps below expectations. 30 Toll Holdings. An alternative means of stratifying the discount rate variance data is by goodwill intensity score, as set out in Table 5 , below. This data yet again reinforces the very small proportion of total sample firm goodwill subjected to impairment testing using discount rates in excess of expectations. On the other hand, it does not seem to be systematically the case that higher goodwill intensity firms select lower than expected discount rates to a greater degree than lower goodwill intensity firms. manifest on a pari passu basis, as suggested by Li and Meeks (2006) , the propensity to adopt measures designed to minimise the likelihood of forced impairment losses may be independent of the materiality of firm goodwill balances.
CONCLUSION
It is axiomatic that the choice of discount rates represents one of the most centrally material factors bearing on the answers yielded by economic valuation models based on estimates of future cash flows. Given the strong reliance on discounted cash flow modelling as a basis for the determination of CGU recoverable amounts, it is clear that decisions bearing on discount rate selection are of paramount importance in influencing the outcomes of impairment testing processes implemented pursuant to IFRS.
Much rests on the robustness of the impairment testing procedures applied to goodwill. A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that capital markets treat impairment data as having fresh significance for asset pricing, while in the wake of a period of strong transaction volumes in M&A markets, goodwill occupies an increasingly material place on the balance sheets of large listed corporations (Carlin and Finch 2008 ).
Yet the execution of robust impairment testing according to the precepts of the IFRS regime is a highly complex task, requiring the alignment of an array of elements including (but not limited to) appropriate definition of CGUs, appropriate allocation of assets to CGUs, the adoption of appropriate growth profiles for firm cash flows and of course, the choice of an appropriate discount rate to translate estimates of future cash flows into their present economic equivalents.
Failure to appropriately align each of these elements results in outcomes of questionable meaning and value. Prior research has provided evidence consistent with opportunism on the part of reporting entities in their choices pertaining to the basic architectural features of their impairment testing mechanisms, particularly their pursuit of impairment avoiding internal portfolio diversification via the excessive aggregation of CGUs (Carlin and Finch 2008) . This study calls into question the manner in which the machinery located within that architectural framework operates by demonstrating the likelihood of bias in the selection of discount rates.
Whatever the theoretical attractions of the IFRS impairment regime for goodwill, it is apparent from the empirical record that there is reason for concern that all has not been well in the process of translation from idea to action. If bias in the selection of discount rates exists, fundamental questions must be asked about the quality of reported earnings, the validity of valuations ascribed to goodwill and the status to be accorded to financial statements produced in conformity with the IFRS regime. This should be a matter of serious concern to policy makers, regulators, auditors and financial statement users alike.
